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MARTIAL RULE, IN THE LIGHT OF STERLING
V. CONSTANTIN
-CHARLES F~imNtw

I
By its decision in R. S. Sterling, Governor of the State of Texas, et al.
v. E. Constantin, et al.,' the Supreme Court has placed a limit upon a
significant though little-noticed trend in American public law.
Among the numerous occasions where governors have declared
"martial law", only once before since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment had the measures taken thereunder been brought before
the Supreme Court; and in that case, Moyer v. Peabody,2 the governor
emerged victorious. Wishful thinking about the Moyer decision, as
well as a number of cases in federal district and state supreme
courts,3 made it appear that on his own finding of necessity, declared
in a proclamation of "martial law", the governor might use the
military arm of the State subject to no effective judicial control.
Hence the significance of the instant case, which held that the measures of martial rule taken by the governor of Texas amounted to a
taking of property without due process of law.
For a variety of reasons, natural and legal, the world's oil industry
was already overdeveloped and disorganized when further confusion
4
was added by the discovery of tremendous oil deposits in East Texas.
By i931 this field alone was producing approximately a million
barrels of oil per day, while the price of crude oil tumbled accordingly.
The Texas legislature, on August 12, 1931, passed an amended oil
conservation act, authorizing the State Railroad Commission to
make proration orders limiting production. On August i6, before
any such order had been made, Governor Sterling issued a proclamatAssistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College.
'287 U. S. 378, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932).
2212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 227 (1909).

3Moyer v. Peabody, 148 Fed. 870 (C. C. D. Colo. 19o6); U. S. ex rel. McMaster
v. Wolters, 268 Fed. 69 (S. D. Texas 1920); U. S. ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280
Fed. 208 (D. Neb. 1922); U. S. ex rel. Palmer v. Adams, 26 F. (2d) 141 (D.
Colo. 1928),29 F. (2d) 541 (C.C.A. 8th 1928) (dictum); Inre Moyer, 35 Colo. 154,
85 Pac. i9O (19o4); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 6o9, 57 Pac. 7o6 (1899); Commonwealth
ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 2o6 Pa. St. I65, 55 Atl. 952 (1903); State ex rel.
Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912); Ex pare Jones, 71 W. Va.
567,77 S. E. 1029 (1913); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 8i S. E. 533 (1914);
Ex parteLavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, IO8 S. E. 428 (1921).
4
Logan, The Use of MartialLaw to Regulate the Economic Welfare of the State and
its Citizens (1931) 17 IOWA L. REv. 40; Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planningof
PetroleumProduction(1931) 41 YALE L. J. 33; (1933) 42 ibid. 702.
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tion reciting that in certain counties in East Texas a group of oil
producers were in insurrection against the conservation laws; that by
reason of their reckless production enormous physical waste was resulting; and that this condition had brought about such a state of public feeling that acts of violence were to be anticipated. Wherefore he
declared "martial law" and directed General Wolters to assume
command. The troops were ordered in and the wells were closed.
On September 2, 1931, the Commission made an order fixing 225
barrels per day as the amount that might be produced at any East
Texas well, and the governor permitted the wells to be reopened and
to produce at this rate. On September i8the Commission reduced
the rate to 185, and on October io to 165, and these maxima were
enforced by the governor through the military officers.
On October 13 Constantin and others, as owners of interests in oil
and gas leaseholds, brought suit in the Federal District Court against
the Commission, the general in command, and others. Their bill
alleged that the members of the Commission had conspired, under
color of applying the conservation laws, to impose an arbitrary limitation upon production in the interest of higher prices, thereby depriving the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law,
and denying them the equal protection of the laws. An injunction
was prayed for. The district judge issued a temporary restraining
order forbidding defendants to limit plaintiffs' production below 5ooo
barrels per well, and proceeded to organize a three-judge court.
Thereupon Governor Sterling, who had not thus far been a party
to the controversy, ordered the general to maintain the limit of 165
barrels, and as new wells came in this figure was lowered until on
December io it was fixed at oo. It was hoped that while the Commission obeyed the restraining order the governor could take over
"the proration end" as an exercise of "martial law", and so escape the
control of the courts. Complainants filed an amended bill making the
governor and adjutant general parties to the suit, and challenging the
executive and military orders as contrary to state and Federal
Constitutions. So when the case came on for hearing it was the
measures of "martial law" rather than the orders of the Commission
which were before the three-judge court. The position of the State
officers was that the proclamation of "martial law" was conclusive;
that war powers might therefore be exercised; and that during the
continuance of this regime the court was without jurisdiction. As
the court found:
"It was conceded that at no time has there been any actual
uprising in the territory. At no time has any military force been
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'exerted to put riots or mobs down. At no time, except in the
refusal of defendant Wolters to observe the injunction in this
case, have the civil authorities or courts been interfered with or
their processes made impotent."'
The court, speaking through Hutcheson, Circuit Judge, held that
no proclamation could avail to insulate a State officer from judicial
process. Coming to the merits, it was declared that under the
constitution and laws of Texas, properly construed, when the State
troops were called out by the governor
"they were called out to act as civil officers, with no more power
than civil officers would have, that in their actions they were
amenable to inquiry, as civil officers are, in their actions, and
that neither the proclamation of martial-law, nor the purported
military character
of the actions, constitutes any defence to
6
plaintiffs' suit."
The three-judge court issued a permanent injunction. An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court, which on December

12, 1932,

affirmed

the judgment. The Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, said
that the fiat of the governor could not supersede the Constitution of
the United States as the supreme law of the land. Its more detailed
statement is -set forth below.
II

To tell the place of "martial law" in the history of English law
is a long story.7 The view long received grew out of the struggle
between Parliament and the Crown, and, as Professor Corwin has
remarked, it was strongly Whiggish. 8 Lord Chief Justice Holt, for
example, who sat in the King's Bench after the Revolution of 1688,
and who' was deeply attached to Whig principles, viewed with the
greatest jealousy the employment of soldiers to restore peace among
the civil population.9 Yet the Government in Ireland and colonial
governors often acted on the contrary view that there was a prerogative to exercise "martial law", and this was inferentially supported
by two Acts of Parliament."0 Sir Frederick Pollock has compressed
the matter in these few sentences:
6Constantin, et al. v. Smith, et al., 57 F. (2d) 227, 231
6
Supra note 5, at 241.

(E.

D. Texas

1932).

7It has been done by I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1883) 207;
FAIRMN, LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (1930); Holdsworth, MartialLaw Historically
Considered (1902) i8 LAw Q. REv. 117.
8
Corwin, MartialLaw, Yesterday and Today (1932) 47 POL. SCI. Q. 95, 103.
9III LORD

CAMPBELL, LIVsS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES (1874)

60.

1043 GEO. III c. 117 (1803) and 3 and 4 WM. IV, c. 4 (1833) refer to "His

Majesty's undoubted prerogative" to exercise martial law.
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"Some writers deny that outside the actual seat of hostilities
there is any common law justification at all. Some think that
there is, and that it wholly excludes the authority of the Courts;
one or two have propounded extravagant theories of a supposed
prerogative of the Crown in the matter. I venture to think it
the better opinion that whatever, in time of war within the jurisdiction, is or reasonably appears necessary for the common
defence against the King's enemies is justified by the common law,
but that, in the absence of an Act of idemnity, the existence of
the necessity and the reasonableness of the action are to be
determined by the ordinary Courts when peace is restored.""
The only theory on which the common law justified the exercise of
martial rule is expressed by the maxim quod enim necessitas cogit
defendit.u
How far this justification could be stretched to cover the extraordinary powers needed by a government in the event of some major
national emergency no one can say. For instead of putting the
question to the test in actions brought against public officers, it has
been the practice to secure an act of indemnity. The outbreak of the
World War, and then the attempt to restore order in Ireland, made it
necessary to secure in advance statutory authority for martial rule. 13
And now by the Emergency Powers Act of 192014 it has been made a
permanent feature of English law that the Crown may declare that a
state of emergency exists if it appears to His Majesty that any action
has been taken or is immediately threatened, which is calculated,
by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel,
light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or
any substantial portion thereof, of the essentials of life. The effect
of such a declaration is that thereupon His Majesty in Council may
make regulations for securing the essentials of life to the community.
Dicey's classic exposition of the rule of law has come to be both a
'POLLOCK, LAW OF ToRTs, (13th ed. 1929) 127. If the emergency falls short of
a state of war the powers of the Crown would be correspondingly less.
' 2As L. C. B. Palles observed in Rainsford v. Browne, 2 New Irish Jur. Rep.
179,

186

(1902);

to

the same effect was I STEPHEN, op. cit. note 7, at 215.
& 5 GEO. V, c. 29 (1914), often amended

13DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT,4

thereafter;
RESTORATION OF ORDER IN IRELAND ACT, I0 & ii GEO. V, c. 31 (1920).
4
1 1O & II GEO. V, c. 55. Sir Gordon Hewart, A. G. (as he then was) was one of
the sponsors for the Bill, while Labourites and others, including Mr. Asquith and
Lord Robert Cecil, fought it with remarkable tenacity, and secured some amendments looking toward more effective parliamentary control. 133 H. C. DEB. 5S.,
and 42 H. L. DEB. 5s, passim. The Act is, of course, to be applied only in emergencies (such as was the General Strike in 1926); yet it undoubtedly constitutes a
feature of that extension of the powers of the Crown of which Lord Chief Justice
Hewart writes in THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929). Reviewed in (1930) 39 YALE

L. J. 763.
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marker from which to measure the growth of administrative control
and a target at which to shoot. After a characteristically unfriendly
sketch of the French 9tat de si~ge he assures us that "this kind of
martial law is in England unknown to the constitution". 16 He could
scarcely say so since the Emergency Powers Act was added to the
common law powers of the Crown.
The state of siege may lawfully be proclaimed only "en cas de peril
imminent, resultantd'une guerre 6trangreou d'une insurrectiona main
armee". Emergency powers may, in England, be taken in less dire
exigencies. The state of siege may be declared only by Parliament, or
by the President if necessary during an adjournment. In the latter
case Parliament convenes in two days. In Great Britain it is the
King in Council that declares the state of emergency, and Parliament
if not in session must be convened in five days. In neither country
could tle courts set aside the declaration as unjustified by the facts.
The legal consequences of the state of siege in France are briefly
these :' 0

(i) The powers of police devolve upon the military authority.
But a citizen may sue in an administrative tribunal to have an
arrgtdpromulgated under this head annulled for exc~s de pouvoir.
Or he may wait until he is proceeded against in7 the ordinary
courts, and then challenge the arr~t6as ultra vires.1
(2) The military authority becomes vested with four exceptional powers:
(a) To search, by day or night, in any habitation.
(b) To send from the area individuals not having their
domicile therein.
(c) To search for and seize arms.
(d) To forbid publications and meetings which the military
authority considers of a nature to excite or result in
disorder.
(3) The 9tat de si~ge transfers from the judicial courts to conseils de guerre jurisdiction over crimes against the Constitution
or the safety of the Republic, or against order and the public
peace. And when the emergency is mere insurrection this
jurisdiction is further limited by the Law of April 27, igi6.8
In Great Britain, on the other hand, the result of a proclamation is
that the executive may issue regulations for the preservation of the
peace, for securing the necessities of life, and for any other purposes
"THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th Ed. 1915) 283-289.
"GLAw OF AUGUST 9, 1849, C.3.
T
1 A number of decisions of the Cour de Cassation, in some of which the defendant's contention was upheld, are reported in Sirey (1917). I. 25.
"8DUGUIT, II TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL (2d. ed. 1921) 257 et seg.; III,
698 et seg.; IV, 413 el seg; V, 74 el seq.
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essential to the public safety and the life of the community. Such
regulations are to be laid before Parliament as soon as may be, and
shall not continue in force for more than seven days thereafter unless
by a resolution passed by both Houses. Enforcement of the regulations may be by courts of summary jurisdiction, with a maximum
penalty of three months imprisonment or a fine of £ioo, or both.
The regulations may not impose compulsory military or industrial
conscription.
In short, it has been found expedient to supplement by statute the
common law powers of the Crown in case of national emergency, and
the contrasts between the English state of emergency and the French
state of siege are less marked than the resemblances.
III
The common law justification for the use of force necessary for the
preservation of the peace is equally applicable in the United States.
But constitutional and statutory provisions have introduced features
peculiar to this country. Federal and state laws authorize the chief
executive to recognize by proclamation the existence of an insurrection, and to employ military forces for its suppression. Such a
proclamation is conclusive of the existence of insurrection. 9 During
Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842 the legislature declared
"martial law", and Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the majority of
the Court, said that:
"if the government of Rhode Island deemed the armed opposition
so formidable, and so ramified throughout the State, as to require the use of its military force and the declaration of martial
law, we see0 no ground upon which this court can question its
authority."
I write this court in italics, for it indicates what the Court really
held. It was a question of local law, on which the Federal courts
would follow those of Rhode Island, 21 there being at that date no
Fourteenth Amendment under which the Supreme Court could exercise a supervisory power. But by giving this sentence an unwarranted
significance, and by laying hold of careless words such as those wherein the Chief Justice said "It was a state of war"," the case has sometimes been made to seem an affirmative authority for the legality of
"martial law". The Court held that which of two factions was the
'Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. i9 (U. S. 1827), invariably followed in a long line
of state and federal cases.
20
Luther v. Borden 7 How. 1, 45 (U. S. 1848).
o
2'Supranote 20, at 4 .
2'Supra note 2o, at 45.
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rightful government constituted a political question, and the President by recognizing one of them concluded the Court. Itdidnothold
that the necessity for an exercise of "martial law" by that State
government was a political question.
If one infers from the Chief Justice's opinion a rather tolerant
attitude toward martial rule in times of emergency, precisely the
opposite tendency was shown in i861 in his opinion as Circuit Justice,
in Ex parte Merrymazi,n where the Lincoln Administration had
temporarily detained a person suspected of destroying railroad
bridges at Baltimore to prevent the passage of troops to the defence of
Washington.
Two years later the Supreme Court, renewed by three Lincoln
appointees, who had a different attitude toward executive power in
time of war, decided the Prize Cases,2 holding that:
"Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commanderin-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such hostile
resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will
compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a
question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed
by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted. 'He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.' ",25
Specifically, it decided that the President might establish a blockade
of the rebel states without waiting for a Congressional declaration of
war.
Then in Ex parle Milligan,6 decided after the war was over, the
Court declared that:
"Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open and in
proper and unobstructed exercise of their
27 jurisdiction. It is
also confined to the locality of actual war."
Now the Prize Cases and the Milligan case grew out of quite
different factual circumstances, and strictly construed the holdings
are not irreconcilable. Yet in a broad sense it is true that in the
former an executive proclamation was held conclusive of the legality
of war measures not otherwise lawful, while in the latter an executive
proclamation was not conclusive, and "actual and present" necessity,
of which the courts were to judge, was held to be the criterion. The
21Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (D. Md. I86i).
242 Black 635 (U. S. 1863).
25
Supra note 24, at 670.
24 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
27
Supra note 26, at 127. It has been rather widely felt that this language was
too restrictive. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 145. Courts in the British
Empire have been forced to allow a wider scope to executive power once a state
of war is made out. Id., ch. 7.
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Milligan decision was the last word, and has generally been regarded
as having settled the law.
Such, in brief, was the background when toward the close of the
century the lines between workers and employers came to be sharply
drawn. There followed presently a series of labor disputes, usually
in mining areas, where State executives resorted to measures of
"martial law". Perhaps Mr. Cleveland's use of troops in the Pullman
strike, and the subsequent opinion in Re Debs 8 had something to do
with popularizing this modus operandi. At any rate there soon
appeared a number of decisions in which the doctrine of the Prize
Cases was carried over into state constitutional law. This, it is submitted, was a capital mistake, for it would seem that under the
United States Constitution a state has no power to wage war, and
that if domestic violence came to such a pass it would be the task of
the Federal government to make good the guaranty of Article IV
sec. 4.
In re Boyle, 29 In re Moyer,'9 and Ex parte McDonald3' were applications for writs of habeas corpus. The respective Supreme
Courts held that the governor's declaration was conclusive of the
existence of an insurrection, and that preventive detention during the
emergency was a lawful means of accomplishing the duty to suppress
the insurrection. Very emphatically these cases do not hold that the
governor may suspend the writ of habeas corpus; they do not hold
that by mumbling the incantation "martial law" the governor can
increase the scope of his lawful powers, or deprive the courts of their
jurisdiction to review executive acts.
Moyer v. Peabody" was an action for damages by a union leader
against the former governor and militia officers by whom he had been
detained for 76 days during the suppression of an insurrection. The
State court had upheld the detention.3 3 'As to the federal question the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, quoted the statute to
the effect that "when an invasion of or insurrection in the State is
made or threatened the Governor shall order the National Guard to
repel or suppress the same", and continued:
"That means that he shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist and, of
course, that he may use the milder measures of seizing the bodies
of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring
peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are
by way of precaution to prevent the exercise of hostile power.
U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
3035 Colo. 154, 85 Pac. 19o (19o4).
32212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235 (1909).
28158

296 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899).
3149 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914).
33Supra note 3o.

28
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So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest
belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off,
the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an
action after he is out of office on4 the ground that he had not
reasonable ground for his belief."
During martial rule in Montana in x914 the commanding officer
destroyed a quantity of liquor as a punishment for a saloon
keeper's failure to obey a closing order. In an action to recover the
State Supreme Court said:
"That within the narrow limits of actual and pressingnecessity,
private property may be taken and destroyed for the public good,
scarcely admits of doubt. The most common illustration of this
is the demolition of a building to prevent the spread of a conflagration. But in every instance where such a right has been exercised
and questioned, the decision upholding the right makes it clear
beyond controversy that only the most overriding necessity will
justify or excuse the officer ordering such destruction."35
In making "imminent and overwhelming necessity" the justification
for trespass to property the Montana Court was following most
authoritative decisions of the United States Supreme Court.3 This
test, it will be noted, is more severe than that laid down in the detention cases above. This does not mean that liberty of person is an
interest less worthy of judicial protection than is private property.
Rather, it may be said that on habeas corpus proceedings it is usually
possible to show that preventive detention is a means plainly adapted
to accomplishing the governor's constitutional duty to suppress
insurrection: reasonable appropriateness is therefore the test. The
destruction of property is not ordinarily regarded as an apt measure
for suppressing insurrection, and so trespasses to property are to be
justified, if at all, only on common law grounds. 37
The truly distressing development came with the West Virginia
cases of I912-I4.38 As a means of restoring order in the coal mines
along Paint and Cabin Creeks, where an acute labor dispute was in
progress, the goverior declared the existence of a state of war. The
Court of Appeals held this declaration to be conclusive, and thereupon
conceded to the governor powers appropriate to a commander on the
field of battle. In particular it refused to interpose when a military
'4Moyer
v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78,84-85,29 Sup. Ct. 235,236.
3
6Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 6oi, 61o, 161 Pac. 164, 166-167.
'6Mitchell v. Harmony 13 How. ii5 (U. S.1851); U. S. v. Russell 13 Wall. 623
(U.37S.1871).
See remarks of Judge Learned Hand in Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson,
255 Fed. 99 (S.D. N. Y. 1939).
3
State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (I932); Ex parle Jones, 71 W. Va.
567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1913); Hatfieldv. Graham 73W.Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914).
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commission sentenced civilians to the penitentiary for terms of
years,3 9 and when a newspaper was suppressed for opposing the
measures the government was taking. Seven years later the decision
of the West Virginia court in Ex parte Lavinder,40 freeing on habeas
corpus a prisoner held during a subsequent "war", distinguishes the
earlier cases, but leaves their authority considerably impaired.
This exercise of "punitive martial law" in West Virginia was
followed by the setting up of a military tribunal for the trial of
civilians during the longshoremen's strike at Galveston in 192o, and
again in the packers' strike at Nebraska City in 1922. In each case
the military custody was challenged in a Federal district court, and
in each habeas corpus was denied and the exercise of war powers expressly upheld.4 ' Finally in 1928 another Federal district court released on habeas corpus proceedings a prisoner held without charges
during the miners' strike in Colorado; but the court added this dictum:
"If the governor had declared martial law, we would have an
entirely different situation. All the rules applicable thereto,
which the ' courts
and others are bound to recognize, would come
'
into play. 4
It is evident that, whatever the courts of any particular State
might allow in the way of extraordinary executive process during
public emergencies, there was need of a decision from the United
States Supreme Court to settle the federal questions involved.
IV
If we turn for a moment from "martial law" in the books to
"martial law" in practice, we find that it has become almost a
household remedy. In Texas, for example, it has been invoked
seven times in the last fourteen years.4 It is, of course, desirable
3

'State v. Brown, supra note 38.

4

0Supra note 3.

41U. S. ex rel. McMaster v. Wolters, supra note 3; U. S. ex rel. Seymour v.

Fischer, supra note 3.
2U. S. ex rel. Palmer et al. v. Adams, Governor of Colorado, supranote 3.
43By Gov. Hobby: June 1919, in Gregg county, during inter-racial riots, duration io days; September i919, in Aransas and San Patricio counties and at Port
Aransas, following a hurricane, duration 3o days; June 192o, at Galveston, during
a longshoremen's strike, duration June 7 to Sept. 3o.
By Gov. Neff: Jan. 1922, at Mexia, as a result of disorder consequent upon the
opening of an oil pool, duration Jan. II to end of February; July 1922, at Denison,
during a strike of the Federated Shop Craft Union, duration July 26 to Oct. 21.
By Gov. Moody: Sept. 1929, at Borger and in Hutchinson county. The danger
was an "organized and entrenched criminal ring" in a newly-opened oil field. It
lasted from Sept. 29 to Oct. 18.
By Gov. Stirling: in the West Texas oil field, as narrated above. See BRIG. GEN.
JACOB F. WOLTERS, MARTIAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1930).
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that some rational process be devised for the solution of economic
conflicts, and in the meantime the peace must be preserved. But it
is neither an expedient nor a lawful course to call the conflict an
insurrection and then force one party into line by the use of troops.
In the Galveston strike the troops kept pickets away from the docks
and maintained a condition of laissez faire. In the West Texas oil
field the system of laissez faire was declared to amount to insurrection, and a crude form of state control was imposed. The interests
involved are too important for their evaluation to be left to the
rough empiricism of a single executive officer.
In Oklahoma Governor Murray imposed "martial law" at the same
time as Governor Sterling in Texas, as a means of shutting down oil
wells in an effort to bring the price up to a dollar a barrel." In July
1931 he called forth the national guard to open an interstate bridge
which had been closed at the Texas end by a court order.45 In Idaho
"martial law" was recently proclaimed on the occasion of forest
fires suspected of being of incendiary origin. 48 Troops were used in
Iowa to enforce the State tuberculin test of cattle, 47 and in Louisiana
by Governor Huey Long when, on his election to the Senate, the
48
lieutenant governor attempted to assume the gubernatorial office.
The case of Harlan county is notorious. The popular impression
that a declaration of "martial law" has some magic potency is suggested by the remark attributed to Governor Olson of Minnesota:
"Not even the President of the United States, except through
establishment
of martial law, could suspend the collection of
49
debts."

V
Such was the background, in recent law and practice, when Sterling
v. Constantin came before the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice,
speaking for a unanimous bench, affirmed the judgment below. In
the light of our present discontent and the consequent likelihood of
more frequent resort to extraordinary executive action, the decision
is of particular interest, both in what it says and in what it omits.
The Court reviews the facts and the decision of the three-judge
court holding that under the Texas Constitution the action of the
governor was ultra vires.
4
4

'Logan, loc. cit. supra note 4.
1NEw INTERNATIONAL YEAR BooK (193), p. 612.

46Supranote 45, at 398.
47
Supra note 45, at 418.
48Supra note 45, at 418.
49N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1933, at p. 3. Other instances have occurred in the
troublous months since this article was written.
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The Chief Justice goes on to say:
"While we recognize the force of these observations, and the
question of the interpretation of the provisions of the state
constitution is before us, it is still a matter of local law, as to
which the courts of the State would in any event have the final
word. We do not find it necessary to determine that question
and we shall not attempt to explore the hist6ry of Texas or to
review the decisions of the state courts citedbytheappellees. We
pass to the consideration of the federal question presented, and
for that purpose we shall assume, without deciding, that the law
of the State authorizes what the Governor has done."50
While the complainants were seeking equitable relief for what the
district court found to have been a deprivation of property unjustified
by any existing emergency,
"appellants assert that the court was powerless thus to intervene
and that the Governor's order had the quality of a supreme and
unchallengeable edict, overriding all conflicting rights of property
and unreviewable through the judicial power of the Federal
Government.
If this extreme position could be deemed to be well taken, it is
manifest that the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land;
that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases, the futility of
which the State may at any time disclose by the simple process of
transferring powers of legislation to the Governor to be exercised
by him, beyond control, upon his assertion of necessity. Under
our system of government, such a conclusion is obviously untenable. There is no such avenue of escape from the paramount
authority of the Federal Constitution."'"
The Court did not overlook the range of discretion which must be
reserved to State governments:
"As the State has no more important interest than the maintenance of law and order, the power it confers upon its Governor
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief of its military forces
to suppress insurrection and to preserve the peace is of the highest consequence. The determinations that the Governor makes
within the range of that authority have all the weight which can
be attributed to state action, and they must be viewed in the
light of the object to which they may properly be addressed and
with full recognition of its importance." 52
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Not only was the decision of the executive as to the existence of an
insurrection conclusive:
"By virtue of his duty to 'cause the laws to be faithfully
executed', the Executive is appropriately vested with the discretion to determine whether an exigency requiring military aid for
that purpose has arisen. His decision to that effect is conclusive....
"The nature of the power also necessarily implies that there is
a permitted range of honest judgment as to the measures to be
taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and restoring order, for without such liberty to make immediate decisions, the power itself would be useless. Such measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly
related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its
continuance, fall within the discretion of the Executive in the
exercise of his authority to maintain peace."13
It was on this ground that Moyer v. Peabody had been decided:
"In that case it appeared that the action of the Governor had
direct relation to the subduing of the insurrection by the temporary detention of one believed to be a participant, and the general
language of the opinion must be taken in connection with the
point actually decided.""
The Court did not find it necessary to consider the significance of
the expression "martial law" nor to determine the permissible scope
of determinations of military necessity in all conceivable emergencies:
"The question before us is simply with respect to the Governor's attempt to regulate by executive order the lawful use of
complainants' properties in the production of oil. Instead of
affording them protection in the lawful exercise of their rights as
determined by the courts, he sought, by his executive orders, to
make that exercise impossible.''"
It is notable that the Supreme Court did not follow the court below
in laying down the rule that in suppressing insurrection a military
commander is limited to the powers of a police officer. 7 However
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This view is stated with emphasis in Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W.
484 (i9nm), approved in Fluke v. Canton, 31 Okla. 718, 123 Pac. zO49 (1912). A
similar view was taken in Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 2oo N. W. 278
(1924).

The same thesis was developed by H. W. Ballantine in his articles on Martial
Law (1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 529; Military Dictatorship in California and West
Virginia (1913) i CALiF. L. Rav. 413; and UnconstitutionalClaims of Military

MARTIAL RULE AND PETROLEUM
this may be as a question of state law, the Supreme Court does not
say that the Fourteenth Amendment implies so rigorous a test. Between the powers of a police officer and those of a general in the field
in time of war there is a wide margin, and because the latter criterion
is rejected it does not follow that the other is the necessary alternative. Instead the Chief Justice speaks of a range of honest judgment,
measured by the test of direct relation to subduing the insurrection.
In saying that it is only the proclamation of a state of insurrection,
and not the orders issued in the premises, to which the courts must
give conclusive value, the Supreme Court cuts away the ground on
which the West Virginia cases of 1912-1914 rested, and also the
judgments of the federal district courts upholding the governor's
war powers. In emphasizing the preventive nature of the executive
action upheld in the Moyer case the Court conveys a clear admonition
that punishment by military tribunal and other excesses such as the
suppression of a newspaper would not be upheld on appeal.
In the case at hand the Court concludes that:
"There was no exigency which justified the Governor in attempting to enforce by executive or military order the restriction
which the District Judge had restrained pending proper judicial
inquiry. If it be assumed that the Governor was entitled to
declare a state of insurrection and to bring military force to the
aid of civil authority, the proper use of that power in this inAuthority (I915) 24 YALE L. J. I89; (1915) 5 JOURNAL AMER. INST. CRIM. LAW
CRIMN.718. In Qualified Martial Law, a Legislative Proposal (1915) 14
MicH. L. REv. 102, 197, Professor Ballantine suggests that rather than have one
law in theory and another in practice it may be wise to concede somewhat larger
powers to the national guard than are allowed to peace officers. He adds a draft
code designed to formulate clearly the powers and liability of soldiers called out to
suppress riot or insurrection.
In contrast with these views was Commonwealth v. Shortall 2o6 Pa. St. 165, 55
At. 952 (19o3), where it was held that a homicide committed by a member of the
militia called out to suppress disorder, committed without malice in the performance of his supposed duty as a soldier, and under the order of an officer, is excusable, unless it is manifestly beyond the scope of the militiaman's authority or is
such as a man of ordinary understanding would know was illegal. So where a
sentinel, posted at night where dynamiting was apprehended, shot and killed a
civilian who did not halt when repeatedly challenged, it was held that there was
not a prima facie case, and the prisoner was released on habeas corpus. The court
said "There is no real difference in the commander's powers in a public war and in
domestic insurrection"; but it adds that in the former he is answerable only to his
military superiors, while in the latter "he is accountable, after the exigency has
passed, to the laws of the land."
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sterling v. Constantin is not directly in
point, but makes it clear that judicial control is not deferred until the exigency
has passed.
AND
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stance was to maintain the Federal court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction and not to attempt to override it; to aid in making its
process effective and not to nullify it; to remove, and not to
create, obstructions to the exercise by the complainants of their
rights as judically declared. It is also plain that there was no
adequate remedy at law for the redress of the injury and, as the
evidence showed that the Governor's orders were an invasion
under color of state law of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, the District Court did not err in granting the injunction." 8
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as judicially
applied, has certainly produced asymetrical results. Considering
how much has fallen under its stroke it was anomalous that there
should be no Supreme Court decision squarely limiting the extraordinary "martial law" powers claimed and exercised of late.Whether
one chooses to think of due process as identified with the historical'
phrase per legem terrae-oras connoting a "higher laW'"-or "only as
cautionary, prescriptive of a proceduralpattern"- 9from any point of
view, it is submitted, such arbitrary executive measures are without
constitutional justification.
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